Irretrievable Breakdown of Marriage Must Be Made a Ground for Divorce under the HMA

Law and justice must serve a socially beneficial purpose and remain responsive to the changing needs of society. However, the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, does not adequately address certain realities that spouses encounter in their marital lives. One such pressing issue is the irretrievable breakdown of marriage. Despite its frequent recognition and discussion in judicial pronouncements, it has still not been incorporated as an independent statutory ground for divorce under the Act. Courts in several foreign jurisdictions have also recognised this principle in their matrimonial jurisprudence.

In a recent judgment in N. Sridhar Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh, the Supreme Court declined to grant a divorce to a Telugu couple despite their marriage having virtually ceased to exist for nearly two decades.

The brief facts of the case are that Dr N. Sridhar Reddy and Geetha Prasanthi were married in 2003 according to Hindu rites and rituals. In 2006, the husband moved to the United Kingdom to pursue his career as a doctor. A few months later, his wife joined him there. However, in 2007, she returned to India for the delivery of their son. According to the husband, despite repeated requests, she declined to return to the UK and join him. Consequently, differences between the spouses gradually escalated into a serious matrimonial dispute. In the meantime, the husband acquired British citizenship through naturalisation after fulfilling the requisite residence requirements.

The fundamental legal difficulty arises from the fact that the Hindu Marriage Act does not recognise irretrievable breakdown of marriage as an independent ground for divorce. Section 13 of the Act, 1955, enumerates the statutory grounds on which either spouse may seek a decree of divorce. These include adultery, cruelty, desertion for a continuous period of at least two years, conversion, mental disorder, certain forms of venereal disease, renunciation of the world and presumption of death. However, the irretrievable breakdown of marriage does not find an express place in this list.

The question that Parliament and the judiciary must seriously address is: What purpose is served by keeping a marriage legally alive when its very foundation has collapsed, and there remains no reasonable possibility of reconciliation? Is it fair to compel two individuals to remain tied to a marital relationship which has ceased to serve any meaningful purpose, merely because the statute does not recognise the breakdown of that relationship as a ground for divorce?

Marriage is undoubtedly an important social institution, and its sanctity must be respected. But the law must also recognise that there are situations in which preserving the legal relationship serves neither the interests of the spouses nor the larger interests of society. Prolonged matrimonial litigation, emotional distress and uncertainty can hardly be regarded as a desirable outcome of the legal process.

Parliament must, therefore, consider amending the Hindu Marriage Act to incorporate irretrievable breakdown of marriage as an independent ground for divorce. The Supreme Court, too, has, in appropriate cases, exercised its extraordinary powers under Article 142 of the Constitution to dissolve marriages that have irretrievably broken down. However, such extraordinary judicial intervention cannot be a substitute for a clear statutory provision available to all litigants.

Where a marriage has irretrievably broken down, and all genuine possibilities of reconciliation have been exhausted, the law should facilitate an honourable separation rather than perpetuate a relationship in name alone. Mutual consent, wherever possible, should be encouraged and respected. Ultimately, the law must protect the institution of marriage without turning it into a lifelong legal compulsion when the relationship itself has ceased to exist.

Police and Lawyers' Ruckus Must Be Resolved Before It Is Too Late

 There is an ongoing confrontation between advocates and the police in Delhi, and similar incidents are witnessed in different parts of the country from time to time. The ultimate sufferer in all such situations is the general public.

Go anywhere and ask people about their experience with the police or advocates, and more often than not, you will hear complaints against them. An ordinary person generally avoids visiting a police station or a court unless circumstances leave him with no other option. Hospitals, unfortunately, also fall into a similar category. These are institutions that every citizen may need at some point in life, but nobody wishes to visit them because of the harassment, inconvenience and uncertainty often associated with them.

There is a long-standing perception that the police, instead of protecting ordinary citizens, sometimes become a source of harassment for them. An observation attributed to a former judge of the Allahabad High Court compared the police to goondas in uniform. It is often alleged that police personnel fail to prevent crimes, sometimes support influential criminals, and even implicate innocent people in false cases for the sake of illegal gratification. There are numerous instances where investigations have been mishandled, genuine complaints have not been acted upon, and criminal cases have suffered because of police negligence or misconduct.

However, this does not mean that advocates can cover themselves with glory. There are certainly instances of lawyers behaving in an unacceptable manner, taking the law into their own hands and indulging in activities that are unbecoming of members of the legal profession. The only difference is that the scope and area of an advocate's authority are limited. An advocate can be questioned by a client, reprimanded by a court and subjected to disciplinary proceedings by the Bar Council. The police, on the other hand, exercise considerable power over ordinary citizens, and the misuse of that power can have far-reaching consequences. This makes accountability within the police force particularly important.

The Present Confrontation in Delhi

The immediate dispute originated from a relatively minor incident involving a motorcycle and parking outside a salon in East Delhi. The altercation eventually escalated into a physical confrontation in which advocate Lalit Bansal reportedly sustained a serious head injury. Following the incident, advocates approached the Shahdara police station demanding appropriate action against those allegedly responsible for the assault. The police, on the other hand, registered an FIR against certain advocates, accusing them of misbehaving with police officers, threatening the SHO and obstructing public servants in the discharge of their official duties.

The matter soon escalated, and the Coordination Committee of All District Courts Bar Associations of Delhi called for an indefinite strike by advocates, demanding strict action against the police officers concerned. On November 2, Delhi witnessed an unusual development when a large number of police personnel gathered outside the Police Headquarters to protest against the transfer of their colleagues. The protest reflected resentment within the police force over the action taken against the two officers. The development raises an important question: if the police themselves resort to demonstrations against decisions taken by their senior authorities, what message does it send to the public about discipline within the force? A police force is expected to maintain law and order, and its personnel are required to follow the established chain of command. Their grievances may be genuine and deserve to be heard, but they must be addressed through appropriate institutional channels.

The Larger Issue

The present confrontation should not be treated as a battle between two professional communities. Neither the police nor the advocates can claim to be above the law.

If an advocate assaults a police officer, appropriate legal action must follow. Similarly, if a police officer assaults, threatens or falsely implicates an advocate, the officer must face the consequences. The uniform cannot become a licence to misuse authority, just as the black coat cannot become a licence to intimidate or obstruct public servants.

Both professions are essential to the administration of justice. The police are responsible for maintaining law and order, preventing crime and conducting investigations, while advocates play an important role in protecting the rights of citizens and assisting the courts in the administration of justice. Their responsibilities may be different, but their ultimate objective must remain the same: upholding the rule of law.

The Need for an Immediate Resolution

This is the time when the government, senior police authorities, representatives of the Bar Council and office-bearers of the various Bar Associations must sit together and resolve the issue before it goes out of hand. The government must act now. The issue is no longer merely about a dispute between the police and advocates; it is about the confidence of the common citizen in the institutions that are supposed to protect him.

Marriage should be guided by social propriety

 While marriage is fundamentally an individual and private matter, social conventions have long dictated when and how it should occur. Traditionally, individuals are expected to marry upon reaching an acceptable age, often prompted by community expectations placed on their parents. In contrast to this conventional timeline, modern trends show a noticeable shift toward late-life marriages, divorce, and remarriage.

This evolution is particularly evident among public figures. Recently, a television journalist married a state Chief Minister; both of them were in their fifties, divorced, and the Chief Minister already had two adult sons working as advocates. Media reports indicated they had been in a relationship for years while waiting for their respective divorces to finalise. Similar instances exist, such as a former long-serving chief minister who facilitated the divorce of his partner so they could marry. Having already raised five children from his previous marriage, this later union clearly prioritised companionship and personal fulfilment over the traditional objective of raising a family.

Such relationships frequently spark ethical debates. While no statute can—or should—regulate the private romantic lives of consenting adults, the public often expects leaders in high office to embody certain social values. When prominent figures engage in extramarital relationships or remarry late in life, questions inevitably arise regarding the message they project to society.

Historically, marriage in India was anchored in the Ashrama system—Brahmacharya (student life), Grihastha (householder duties), Vanaprastha (retirement/reflection), and Sannyasa (renunciation). While this framework cannot be rigidly applied today, thinkers like Swami Dayanand Saraswati argued for specific age windows, suggesting that while men could marry up to the age of 48 if they maintained celibacy, women should marry between 16 and 24 due to the biological demands of childbearing.

Yet, history and global precedent demonstrate that human relationships rarely conform to strict biological or age-based doctrines. The British philosopher Bertrand Russell married for the fourth time at the age of 80 after three divorces. Similarly, in India, numerous celebrities have remarried well past their sixties.

Although late-stage marriages—especially involving individuals with grown children—still draw social disapproval, there can be no uniform standard of morality. Ultimately, the balance between personal happiness and social propriety must remain a matter of individual conscience and organic social dialogue rather than rigid regulation.

 

Saudi Arabia Must Hang Its Head in Shame over the Barbaric Execution of Two Bangladeshis

 How can the so-called civilised nations of the world, particularly those that proclaim themselves champions of human rights, remain silent in the face of the reported execution of two Bangladeshis in Mecca? Where are the voices that rise so readily in defence of human dignity, the rule of law and the right to life when confronted with such a disturbing case?

The two Bangladeshis, identified as Nazrul Islam Abdul Basir and Siti Akhtar, were reportedly executed on October 14 over alleged “immoral acts” inside a mosque in Mecca. They were said to have been clicking photographs because it was unthinkable to have indulged in a sexual act in the full glare of thousands of people. Yet Saudi authorities have not publicly disclosed detailed information about the specific acts for which the couple were sentenced to death. When the ultimate punishment is imposed, the public is entitled to ask a fundamental question: what precisely was the offence, what evidence was presented, and by what judicial process was the death sentence justified?

The circumstances surrounding these executions raise grave concerns about transparency, due process and the protection of fundamental human rights. Nazrul’s family has reportedly questioned the fairness of his trial. More disturbingly, the Bangladeshi government has stated that it learnt of the executions through media reports and has sought an explanation from Saudi authorities. If the reported circumstances are accurate, the failure to notify the government of the fate of its citizens represents a deeply troubling lapse in transparency and diplomatic accountability.

The reported use of ta'zir punishment makes the matter particularly deserving of scrutiny. Under the Islamic legal framework, ta'zir generally refers to punishments left to judicial or state discretion for offences not subject to fixed hadd penalties. The existence of judicial discretion, however, cannot by itself answer the essential questions of proportionality, procedural fairness and the protection of human life. Discretion must never become a substitute for accountability.

Equally disturbing is the reported method of execution. Beheading, an exceptionally brutal form of capital punishment, raises profound questions about human dignity and the continued use of the death penalty in the modern world. Whatever offence a person is alleged to have committed, the administration of justice must not become an occasion for the state to demonstrate the power to take life without providing a transparent and credible account of the proceedings.

And what of the right to legal representation? Were the accused afforded effective access to counsel? Were they able to challenge the evidence, appeal their convictions and seek appropriate legal assistance? Were the charges, verdicts and sentences communicated to their families and to the Bangladeshi authorities? These are not peripheral questions. They go to the very heart of justice. The reported failure to inform Bangladesh of the executions makes it all the more urgent that these matters be clarified publicly.

Saudi Arabia cannot expect to command international respect merely by virtue of its wealth, religious significance or geopolitical influence. A state that exercises the power of life and death must be prepared to account for the manner in which that power is exercised. Religious sanctity cannot be invoked to place state action beyond scrutiny, nor can claims of morality excuse the denial of basic procedural safeguards.

The silence of the international community, if it persists in the face of credible concerns, would be equally troubling. Governments, human rights institutions and international organisations should seek a full explanation from Saudi Arabia, establish whether international human rights obligations and applicable legal safeguards were respected, and press for greater transparency in capital cases. Bangladesh, in particular, deserves a clear and comprehensive account of the proceedings involving its citizens.

The issue is larger than the fate of two individuals, tragic though that fate may be. It concerns the kind of justice that modern states must be expected to administer. No legal system should be immune from scrutiny merely because its practices are defended in the name of tradition, religion or sovereignty. Tradition cannot be an excuse for cruelty, and sovereignty cannot be a licence for secrecy.

Saudi Arabia must answer the serious questions raised by these reported executions. The international community must not look away. The right to life, the right to a fair trial and the dignity of every human being demand nothing less.

 

CJI Surya Kant Deserves Commendation for Refusing to Meet Opposition Leaders

Chief Justice of India Justice Surya Kant deserves to be complimented for refusing to meet a delegation of politicians that included the Leaders of the Opposition in the Lok Sabha and the Rajya Sabha. The CJI rightly observed that meeting to discuss matters connected with pending cases would violate the constitutional principle of separation of powers and established norms of judicial propriety.

The INDIA Bloc leaders had sought an appointment to submit a memorandum raising concerns over the Chief Election Commissioner of India, alleged arbitrary arrests of students, the closure of metro stations, the cancellation of trains, and other issues.

What is particularly objectionable and surprising, however, is the very decision of these political leaders to seek an appointment with the CJI to raise such issues. Did they not understand that the judiciary cannot be approached as a forum for political intervention, nor can political leaders expect the Chief Justice to entertain representations that may have a bearing on matters falling within the judicial domain? The constitutional separation of powers is not a mere formality to be invoked selectively; it is a fundamental principle that must be respected by all constitutional functionaries.

The CJI was also right in maintaining that the responsibility for preserving law and order rests primarily with the executive and the police, not the judiciary. Decisions concerning crowd control, public order and the deployment of police forces must ordinarily be taken by the officers on the ground, who are best placed to assess the prevailing situation. Senior police officers may formulate plans and strategies, but their effective implementation must depend upon the judgment of the personnel dealing with the situation on the spot, within the framework of law.

It is equally important to remember that political leaders, including those holding the highest constitutional offices, cannot seek private audiences with judges to discuss cases pending before them. Not even the Prime Minister or the Home Minister can legitimately seek to influence judicial proceedings through private discussions with a judge. If such conduct would be improper on the part of the highest executive authorities, it cannot become acceptable merely because those seeking an audience belong to the Opposition.

The same principle applies to advocates, irrespective of their seniority, standing or professional reputation. No advocate can claim the privilege of privately discussing the merits of a pending case with a judge outside the established judicial process. Matters requiring judicial consideration must be placed before the court through recognised procedures, in accordance with the law and the principles of fairness.

The CJI’s refusal, therefore, sends an important message: the judiciary is neither an extension of the executive nor a forum for political lobbying. Its independence depends not only upon judges resisting improper approaches but also upon political leaders respecting the boundaries imposed by the Constitution.

Justice Surya Kant’s decision deserves commendation for upholding judicial propriety and reaffirming the institutional distance that must exist between the judiciary and political parties. In a constitutional democracy, the credibility of institutions rests as much on the restraint they exercise as on the powers they possess. This refusal is a welcome reminder that no political leader, however influential, can claim a special channel of access to the judiciary.

CEC can be removed only through certain procedures

 It is nothing short of astonishing that advocates claiming to practise before the Supreme Court should participate in a march demanding the removal of Chief Election Commissioner Gyanesh Kumar. One would expect those who claim familiarity with constitutional law to know that the CEC cannot be removed at the government's whim or by street pressure. His removal is governed by a constitutional process comparable to that applicable to a Supreme Court judge. Unlike a minister, who can be removed by the Prime Minister or, in a state, by the Chief Minister, the CEC enjoys constitutionally protected tenure. Neither political expediency nor public agitation can substitute for the procedure prescribed by the Constitution.

The CEC can be removed only on the grounds of proved misbehaviour or incapacity. The process requires a motion signed by at least 100 members of the Lok Sabha or 50 members of the Rajya Sabha, followed by its admission by the presiding officer. A three-member inquiry committee must examine the charges and allow the CEC to respond. If the charges are not established, the proceedings end. If they are established, both Houses of Parliament must adopt the motion by the constitutionally prescribed special majority in the same session. Until this process is followed, demands for removal remain political slogans, not a constitutional determination. The removal of other Election Commissioners follows a different procedure: the President may remove them on the recommendation of the CEC.

This raises a fundamental question: what business does the Supreme Court Bar Association have in involving itself in a politically charged demand that disregards the constitutional mechanism for removal? A professional body representing the legal fraternity must be guided by constitutional principles, not by the temptation to play to the gallery. Advocates are entitled to protest, but they cannot claim constitutional principles as their professional inheritance while ignoring them when politically convenient.

Equally troubling is the reported intervention of the Bench directing the police to release the advocates concerned. The question is not whether the police are invariably right—they plainly are not. The question is whether the law should be allowed to take its course, subject to judicial scrutiny, rather than being pre-empted merely because those involved happen to be members of the legal fraternity. Neither the police nor the judiciary is infallible; both must remain accountable to the law. The rule of law cannot mean one standard for ordinary citizens and another for advocates.

Another claim circulating in newspaper reports is that the CEC overruled the objections of the other two Election Commissioners. This assertion demands closer scrutiny. The Election Commission is a multi-member body, and its decisions are governed by the applicable statutory framework, including the principle of majority decision-making. The CEC does not possess an unfettered veto over the other Commissioners. If a decision was taken against the majority view, the precise proceedings, recorded dissent and applicable legal provisions must be examined before accepting or rejecting the allegation. A newspaper report is not a substitute for the record, and an allegation is not a fact.

As for the protests reportedly organised by the so-called Cockroach Party, with the backing of other opposition parties, the less said, the better. Political opposition is legitimate in a democracy; so is peaceful protest. But neither political mobilisation nor professional solidarity can override the Constitution.

The real test of constitutional commitment is not whether one can raise a slogan demanding someone's removal, but whether one understands—and respects—the law governing that removal. For advocates, particularly those claiming to practise before the highest court of the land, that distinction should be elementary.

 

When Slogans Lose Their Meaning

Slogans are meant to convey an idea, inspire people and give expression to a collective cause. The most memorable slogans in our public life have carried a message that was larger than the words themselves. Consider Netaji Subhas Chandra Bose's famous call, “Tum mujhe khoon do, main tumhe azadi doonga,” or Lal Bahadur Shastri's “Jai Jawan, Jai Kisan.” Slogans such as “Dhan aur dharti bant ke rahegi” and “Jo jotega, woh malik hoga” likewise emerged from particular social and political movements and sought to mobilise people around a cause. Even the more recent “Har Har Modi, Ghar Ghar Modi” was designed to convey a political message and mobilise supporters.

Against this background, slogans such as “Ek kachori, do samosa, in mardon ka kya bharosa” sound less like a meaningful call for social change and more like an attempt at ridicule. Heard in the context of protests over women's safety, the sentiment behind the slogan may be understandable: women have legitimate and serious concerns about sexual violence and personal safety. But the manner in which the slogan expresses that concern deserves scrutiny.

The slogan makes a sweeping generalisation about men. It suggests that men, as a class, are inherently untrustworthy. That is neither fair nor conducive to a healthy conversation between men and women. The overwhelming majority of men are not criminals or sexual offenders. They are fathers, brothers, husbands, sons and colleagues who themselves care deeply about the safety and dignity of women and who have every reason to oppose crimes against them.

Men and women constitute the basic fabric of family and society. They live, work and build their lives together. There are, undoubtedly, men who commit horrific crimes against women, and such offenders must face the full force of the law. But criminality cannot be attributed to an entire gender. Nor is criminal behaviour confined exclusively to men. Individual wrongdoing should be condemned without turning it into a sweeping indictment of millions of people.

A simple analogy illustrates the point. Public transport systems routinely carry warnings such as “Beware of pickpockets.” The warning exists because some people commit theft; it does not mean that every passenger is presumed to be a pickpocket. Similarly, society must remain vigilant against sexual violence without treating every man as a potential offender.

The objective of a campaign for women's safety should be to build greater awareness, accountability and cooperation—not suspicion and hostility between the sexes. Men have an important role in ensuring women's safety, just as women have an important role in challenging harmful behaviour and supporting victims.

The anger behind such protests may have legitimate roots, particularly when a heinous crime has taken place. But slogans matter because language shapes public discourse. A slogan that seeks to unite people around the cause of safety can strengthen a movement; a slogan that places an entire gender under suspicion risks creating an unnecessary divide.

Women deserve safety, dignity and justice. Men deserve not to be collectively branded for crimes they did not commit. A mature society should be capable of demanding accountability from offenders while refusing to condemn an entire gender.

That is why slogans of this kind deserve criticism—not because women's concerns are illegitimate, but precisely because the cause of women's safety deserves a more thoughtful, inclusive and dignified language.